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[L. A. No. 23276.

In Bank.

June 6. 1956.]

BERTHA J. MESSENGER, Appellant, v. THOMAS T.
MESSENGER. Respondent.
[1] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-Labels adopted by the parties to a property settlement agreement, such as that the monthly payments provided
therein are alimony, are not conclusive, and it is not con·
trolling that monthly payments for support have some of
the indicia of alimony.
[2a,2b] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of
Parties.-Husband and wife made a provision for support an
integral part of their property settlement agreement where
they not only entered into the agreement "for the purpose of
fixing and adjusting their personal and property rights" but
made the provision for support "an inseparable part of the
consideration for the property settlement" by expressly agreeing that the support and maintenance provided in one paragraph, like the division of property provided in other paragraphs, was "for and in consideration of the permanent and
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights
of every kind and nature, whether separate or community
property."

)

[lJ See CaI.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 63 j Am.Jur., Husband
and Wife, § 318 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] Husband and Wife, § 157(6);
[2, 3, 8J Divorce, § 203; [6) Husband and Wife, § 157(4); [7]
Divorce, §§ 216, 234(2); [9] Divorce, §§ 249, 265; [10] Divorce,
§ 249.

)
f
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[3a, Sb] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.
-Where provisions for support and maintenance of wife are
an integral and inseverable part of a property settlement
agreement, her express promise not to seek alimony other
than as provided in such agreement cannot be abrogated without changing the agreement; and since such waiver is part of
the consideration for the husband's agreement to make the
support payments, he likewise cannot seek a modification
thereof without changing the property settlement agreement.
[4] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as
to the meaning of a property settlement agreement, the trial
court's interpretation is not binding on the Supreme Court.
[5] Id.-Property Settlement Agreements - Interpretation.-For
the purpose of determining the meaning of a property settlement agreement, the value of accounts receivable assigned to
the husband that is material is the value estimated by the
parties in their agreement, not the value estimated by the
court three years later.
[6] Id.-Property Settlement Agreements-Consideration.-Since
at the time a property settlement agreement is made, the
parties may be uncertain as to which of their property is
community rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not
know how the court in a divorce action will find the facts or
how it would, in the absence of an acceptable agreement, exercise its discretion in dividing the property and awarding alimony, the amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions
with respect to property and support and maintenance rights
of the parties may alone supply sufficient consideration to
support their entire agreement.
[7] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - Modification of Allowance:
Disposition of Community Property.-Where plaintiff secured
her divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, had the parties
not settled their rights by agreement the court in its discretion could have awarded plaintiff all of the community
property and less alimony than she received under the agreement, in which ease the alimony would be subject to reduction
in the event of changed circumstances.
[8] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.A wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of community
property in exchange for support and maintenance provisions
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community
property is substantially dividefl equally has no bearing on the
validity of the provision of the ngreement whereby both parties
waive all rigbts to support and mnintenanee otber than as provided therein.
[9] Id.-Enforcement of Awards-Execution: Contempt.-Where
there was evidence that defendant had been. twice married
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after his divorce from plaintiff, that he had no assets other
than the income from his medical practice on which an execution for delinquent support installments could be levied, and
that he had suffered a partial stroke necessitating loss of time
from his practice, the trial court was justified in finding that
defendant "while in arrears, is not in contempt of (:ourt,"
and in conditionally suspending the issuance of a writ of execution.
[10] ld.-Enforcement of Awards,Execution.-Under Civ. Code,
§ 139, as amended in 1951, the trial court has discretion to determine whether execution is an appropriate remedy for enforcing its order for support payments to a wife granted a
divorce for the husband's offense, and it was not an abuse of
discretion to condition the issuance of execution on the husbllud's noncompliance with an order to discharge arrearages
in installments where the court found on sufficient evidence
that to permit the issuance and enforcement of a writ of
execution would discredit the husband professionally and impair his ability to make the monthly payments and discharge
the arrearages.

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Kings County purporting to amend a property settlement
agreement, holding defendant not in contempt of court, and
suspending issuance of execution. Clark Clement, Judge.
Part of judgment amending provisions of property settlement
agreement and interlocutory judgment based thereon,
reversed j other parts of judgment and order appealed from,
affirmed.
Sidney J. W. Sharp, Herbert M. Braden and Lawrence W.
Clawson for Appellant.
Daniel M.. Fadenrecht for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in
1936 and separated in 1950. On January 3, 1951, they executed a property settlement agreement. Thereafter plaintiff
filed a complaint for divorce. and on January 8, 1951, an
interlocutory decree was granted to her on the ground of
extreme ~rueIty. The decree approved and incorporated by
reference the provisions of the agreement and expressly
ordered defendant to pay $500 per month "as agreed in said
property settlement agreement." The final decree was entered
t'>n January 16, 1952.

)
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In December, 1953, plaintiff applied for an order of execu
tion for claimed arrearages of $6,700 plus interest and secure
an order to show cause why defendant should not be held i
contempt for failing to make the overdue payments. De
fendant then secured an order to show cause why the pay
ments provided for in the decree should not be reduced
$300 per month. The three matters were heard together, and
the trial court entered judgment reducing the monthly payments and finding that defendant was not in contempt for
failure to make the overdue payments. The court also concluded that an execution should not be issued against the
defendant, on the grounds that he "has no properties or
monies against which such execution could be successfully
levied, that the only manner in which such execution could
be served would be by placing a constable in charge of the
daily receipts of the defendant; and, as the defendant is a!
professional man, this Court finds that such an action would,
result in considerable discredit to the defendant; and the'
court further believes that, if such action were taken, that the.
earning ability of the defendant [as a physician and surgeon]
would be reduced to such a degree that it would materially
dect the ability of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
reduced alimony as set by this Court." The court ordered that
the property settlement agreement be amended to provide
for the payment of $375 per month, and income tax on an:
income of $4,500 per year instead of $500 per month and in-"
come tax on an income of $6,000 per year. It found that the .
amount due plamtiff from defendant to March 10, 1954, was
$5,668 and ordered defendant to pay $800 on or before that •
date and $50 per month in addition to the reduced alimony:'
payments to be applied on the balance due. The issuance of j
execution was suspended so long as defendant made these pay-"':
ments, but in the event of default, an execution was to issue j
forthwith.
Plaintiff appeals. She contends that the provisions fori
monthly payments and income tax payments were an integral
and inseparable part of the property settlement agreement
of the parties and are therefore not subject to modification. 1
In their agreement the parties provided:
;{t
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto are husband and wife, and J
.
that said parties hereto have agreed to divide all property
and property rights between them; and
"WHEREAS, said parties do not make any arrangement orA
arrangements as to any divorce proceedings by either of the
'"

1

1
~

I
,;~

11

-~
:~

)
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parties to this agreement, leaving the determination of such
action to the Court, but make and enter into this agreement
for the purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal and
property rights; and
"WHEREAS, the [husband] has represented that he has fully
disclosed to the [ wife] aU of the community property of
every kind and nature, and that the same is being and has
been divided as between the parties under the terms and conditions of this agreement as hereinafter set forth.
"Now THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of every kind and nature, whether separate or
community property, they hereby mutually covenant and
agree, each with the other as follows, to wit:"
Paragraphs 1 and 2 then provided for a division of the
property, and in the present proceeding the trial court found
that plaintiff received property worth $32,850 and that defendant received property worth $31,375.
Paragraph 3 provided" That the husband agrees to pay to
the wife for her care, maintenance and support, the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per month, payable monthly
in advance, commencing on January 3rd, 1951, receipt of
which first month's alimony is hereby acknowledged, such
obligation to pay to continue until the wife dies or remarries."
Paragraph 15 provided "That the husband agrees that
from date hereof he will pay to the wife a sufficient amount
over and above the FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per
month alimony, herein agreed to be paid, to pay the income
tax, if any, to be paid by the wife on said alimony payment . . . . "
The agreement also provided that "It is further understood
and agreed that the wife waives, relinquishes, abandons, and
releases aU of her right, title and interest in and to any and all
property which is hereinbefore agreed shall be set apart to
and become the property of the husband, and to any and all
property of every nature which said husband now has or that
he may hereafter acquire or own, and all right to future
maintenance and support from or by the said husband, except as herein otherwise expressly provided, and hereby
waives, relinquishes and releases all right to inherit any property whatsoever which said husband now owns or possesses
or which he may hereafter own or possess, or of which he may
die seized or possessed, and all property which is hereinbefore

)

)
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set apart to him shall be and remain forever as between the ':
parties hereto the separate property of the husband." . A •
similar provision related to the husband, except that his waiver·
of aU right to future support and maintenance was not qualified by the clause, "except as herein otherwise expressly
provided. "
Plaintiff's complaint referred to the $500 per month payments as alimony and prayed that the court approve the
property settlement agreement, make it part of the decree,
and order defendant to pay $500 per month "for the care,
maintenance and support of the plaintiff, as therein agreed. ''.
The interlocutory decree approved the agreement, made it
part of the decree by reference, and expressly ordered de- .
fendant to pay $500 per month "for the care, maintenance
and support of the plaintiif, as agreed in said property settle- .
ment agreement." The final decree provided that "It is·.
further ordered and decreed that wherein said interlocutory
decree makes any provision for alimony" said provision "be
and the same is hereby made binding on the parties affected
thereby the same as if herein set forth in full, and that
wherein said interlocutory decree relates to the property of
the parties hereto, said property be and the same is hereby
assigned in accordance with the terms thereof to the parties
therein declared to be entitled thereto.
"IT Is FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the ;
community property of the parties hereto is ordered divided, ,;
in accordance with the property settlement agreement ap- ..
proved in the Interlocutory Decree entered herein and the ~.
order for support payments as are provided for therein are
hereby ratified and confirmed."
3l
Since the final decree merely confirms the provisions of ,
the interlocutory decree and the property settlement agree- ,
ment, and since the interlocutory decree ordered that the pay- .;1
ments be made "as agreed in said property settlement agree- j
ment, I f we must examine the agreement to determine whether ~
the provisions for monthly payments and income tax payments are separable from the provisions that divide thej
property, or whether they are an integral and inseparable :
part of the division of property and therefore an inseparable !
part of the consideration for the property settlement. If
they faU into the latter category they cannot now be modified.
(Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36. 40-41 [265 P.2d 873] j Adams
v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 625 [177 P.2d 265].)
[1] In support of his contention that the provisions fall

)

)
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within the former category defendant stresses the fact that
the monthly payments for the wife's support are expressly
referred to in paragraphs l(h),l 3,2 and 158 as alimony and
have one of the principal characteristics of alimony in that
they terminate if the wife dies or remarries. Similar contentions were rejected in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41
[265 P.2d 873]4 and in Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49, 52-53 [265
P .2d 881], Ii where it was pointed out that the labels adopted by

.J

)

S"It is understood and agreed as to this policy [life insurance] that
if, due to financial reverses or other reasons beyond the control of the
husband, it is necessary to borrow money thereon for the purpose of
paying the alimony hereinafter agreed to be paid by the husband, but
for no other purpose, the husband may borrow on said policy for the
purpose of paying said alimony. but for no other purpose•••• " (Italics
added.)
a, • That the husband agrees to pay to the wife for her eare, maintenance and support. the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (.500.00) DOLLARS per
month, payable monthly in advance. commencing on January Srd, 1951.
receipt of which first month '8 alimony is hereby acknowledged, BUeh
obligation to pay to coutinue until the wife dies or remarries. I I (ItaJ1es
added.)
"'That the husband agrees that from date hereof he will pay to the
wife a su1Iicient amount over and above the FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00)
DOLLAJI.S per month alimony, herein agreed to be paid, to pay the income tax, if any, to be paid by the wife on said alimony payment.••• "
(Italics added.)
o"Plaintiff contends. however, that since the monthly payments were
to terminate on her death or remarriage and were described as alimony
in the prayer of her complaint, they should be so treated. She points out
that if they were intended as a division of property it would have been
more reasonable for the agreement to provide that they should continue
until a given amount had been paid_ 'rhese considerations would be more
persuasive if the issue presented was whether, on the one hand, the
monthy payments were 801ely part of a division of the community prop·
erty, or, on the other hand, solely alimony. When, as in this case, however, the parties have made the provision for BUpport and maintenance
an integral part of their property settlement agreement, the monthly
payments will ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that
they are designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance
they will ordinarily re:8ect the r.haraeteristics of that obligation and thus
have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to the
extent that they represent a division of the community property itself,
or constitute an inseparable part ot the consideration for the property
settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modilled
without changing the terms of the property settlement agreement of the
parties. I'
·"Plaintiff contends, however, that since the payments were labeled
alimony, were to cease on her remarriage, and were subject to modification in the event of a reduction of dE'fendant's pension, there is evidence
to support the trial court'. implied finding that they were 801ely alimony
aubject to modification . . . • The labels adopted by the parties are
not conclusive, since the agreement must be considered as a whole. [Cita·
tions.] Moreover, as pointed out in the Dexter ease, to the extent the
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the parties are not conclusive and that it is not controlling thai
the monthly payments for support have some of the indicia
of alimony.
.
[2aJ In this case as in Fox v. Fox, supra, Dexter v. Dexter,
supra, Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Ca1.2d 55, 60-61 [265 P.2d 865],
and Finnegan v. Finnegan, 42 Ca1.2d 762,765 [269 P.2d 873],
the parties have made the provision for support an integral
part of their property settlement agreement. Not only did
they" enter into this agreement for the purpose of fixing and
adjusting their personal and property rights" but they made:
the provisions for support ., an inseparable part of the con- '
sideration for the property settlement" (Dexter v. Dexter,
supra, at pp. 41-42) by expressly agreeing that the support
and maintenance provided in paragraph 3, like the division
of property provided in paragraphs 1 and 2, was "for
and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and
settlement of all their property rights of every kind and
nature, whether separate or community property. . . . "
.
[3aJ Moreover, as in Fox v. Fox, supra, at page 52, the
wife waived "all right to future maintenance and support .
from or by the said husband, except as herein otherwise provided," i.e., in paragraph 3. Her express promise not to seek
alimony except as provided in the agreement could not "be
abrogated without changing the property settlement agreement of the parties." (Ibid.) Similarly, since this waiver,
was part of the consideration for the husband's agreement to i
make the support payments, he likewise could not seek a '
modification thereof without changing the property settle-'
ment agreement of the parties. It is clear, therefore, that if.,
the parties meant the maintenance and support provisions to
be alimony separable from a division of the property they~'
would not have included this waiver (see H elvern v. H eIve"" ~
139 Ca1.App.2d 819, 829-830 [294 P.2d 482]), for an order •. ~
allowing alimony is subject to revision at any time. (Hough]
v. Hough, 26 CaI.2d 605,612 [160 P.2d 1 5 ] . ) ' ; ;
[4J In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as tog
the meaning of the agreement, the trial court's interpreta- '1
tion of it is not binding on this court. (Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal. I
2d 49, 52 [265 P.2d 88]]; Estate of Platt, 2] Ca1.2d 343, 352
[131 P .2d 825].) The evidence offered and introduced in ~
this case was concerned primarily with defendant's ability to

,I

monthly payments are designed to discharge the obligation of support
and maintenance, they will ordinarily have Bome of the indicia of
alimony."
t:'
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pay, his various expenditures, his financial arrangements with
his father, and with the money and other property the husband and wife received under the agreement. The only extrinsic evidenec offered that had any bearing on the meanin~
of the property settlement agreement was that showing tbe
value of the property received by the parties. Proof that defendant received the greater part of the community property
would be some indication that the support provisions were in
lieu of part of plaintiff's share of the community property.
There are two reasons, however, why the trial court's finding
that defendant did not receive the greater part of the community property does not support its conclusion that the
support provisions were not part of the consideration for
the division of the property and were therefore subject to
modifica tion.
[6] (1.) That finding was based on a reevaluation of the
accounts receivable assigned to defendant under the agree·
ment. In the agreement the parties estimated the value of
the accounts at $15,000. The trial court estimated their value
at $5,000. It is obvious that for the purpose of determining
the meaning of the agreement, the value that IS material is the
value estimated by the parties in their a!,.rreement, not the
valne estimated by the court three years later.
(2.) Even if the evidence had showed that when the parties
made their agreement, they understood that plaintiff would
receive property worth $32,850 and defendant would receive
property worth $31,375, it would not support the conclusion
that the payments were subject to modification. The agree·
ment was for a "permanent and lasting division" of all
their rights in separate as well as community property.
[6] As stated in Dexter v. Dexter, (supra, at p. 43) "[A 1t
the time a property settlement is made, the parties may be
uncertain as to which of their property is community rather
than separate, and they will ordinarily not know how the court
in the divorce action will find the facts or how it would, in
the absence of an acceptable agreement, exercise its discretion
in dividing tlle property and awarding alimony. The amicable
adjustment of these doubtful questions with respect to the
property aud support and maintenance rig11ts of the parties
may alone supply sufficient consideration to support their
entire agreement. Citation.] Thus in the ;>resent case, the
parties recited that they desired to settle their property and
support and maintenance rights 'by friendly agreement, instead of resorting to court for said purpose.' [7] Moreover,

r

)
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since plainti1f secured her divorce on the ground of extreme
cruelty, had the parties not settled their rights by agreement, the court could in its discretion have awarded plaintiff
all of the community property and less alimony than she
received under her agreement. In such case, however, the
alimony would be subject to reduction in the event of changed
circumstances. [8] Plaintiff was entitled to agree instead to
an equal division of the community property in exchange for
support and maintenance payments that could not be reduced.
Accordingly, the fact that the community property was
divided equally has no bearing on the validity of the provision
of the agreement whereby both parties waived all rights to
support and maintenance other than as provided therein.
[Citations.]" In the present case the very fact that the finding of the respective values was based on conflicting evidence
indicates that the parties were in doubt as to the value of
their property and that they meant what they said when they
provided that both the division of their property and the
monthly payments were "for and in consideration of the
permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their
property rights of every kind and nature . . . . " Moreover.
in the absence of the agreement the court could have awarded
plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony.
and just as in the Dexter case, she was entitled to agree instead to a substantially equal division of the community property in exchange for support and maintenance payments that
could not be reduced.
[~b, Sb] When as in this case the parties have clearly ex- \
pressed their •• purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal
and property rights," have provided that the provision for
alimony is •• for and in consideration of the permanent and
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights
of every kind and nature," and the wife has waived "all
right to future maintenance and support . . . , except as
herein otherwise expressly provided," the conclusion is inescapable that they have made the provisions for support and
maintenance an integral and inseparable part of their property settlement agreement. With such conclusive evidence of
integration, the provisions for support and maintenance or
alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties
expressly so provided. (See Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal.
2d 55, 61, and cases cited.) The court may not, however,
"insert what has been omitted" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and
I

)
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thereby abrogate the clearly expressed agreement of the
parties.
[9] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing
to find defendant in contempt of court and in conditionally
suspending the issuance of a writ of execution. There was
evidence that defendant had been twice married after his
divorce from plaintiff, that he had no assets other than the
income from his medical practice upon which an execution
could be levied, and that he had suffered a partial stroke
necessitating loss of time from his practice. On the basis
of this evidence and evidence of defendant's income and
expenditures the trial court was justified in finding that defendant, "while in arrears, is not in contempt of Court," and
that "the financial obligations of said defendant have been
of such a nature so as to have prevented the payment of the
sum of $500.00 each and every month."
With respect to the question of execution, both parties rely
on Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Ca1.2d 144 (173 P.2d 657], and
Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, 33 Ca1.2d 195 [200 P.2d 529), dealing
with the right to execution on an instaUment judgment under
the provisions of section 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It was stated in the Lohman case that" Although issuance of
execution upon a judgment requiring monthly payments may
be denied upon equitable grounds, proof that the installments
have accrued within five years6 establishes a prima facie right
to execution and the burden is east upon the judgment debtor
to establish facts justifying an order denying the writ"
(29 Ca1.2d at 150) and in the Di Corpo case that "Thus, upon
proof by plaintiff that instaUments have accrued within
five years, the burden was upon defendant to establish facts
justifying an order recalling the writ!' (33 Ca1.2d at 201.)
We have concluded, however, that it is unnecessary to de·
termine whether defendant has met the burden referred to
in these cases.
Prior to 1951, section 139 of the CiVl1 Code provided that
HWhere a divorce is granted for an offense of the husband,
the court may compel him to provide for the maintenance
of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable
allowance to the wife for her support, during her life or for
a shorter period as the court may deem just, having regard to
the circllmstances of the parties respectively. . . . " An order
·Code of Civil Procedure section 681 was amended in 1955 to provide
for a 10'year instead of a 5'year period.

)
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for support payments under this section was enforceable
by execution pursuant to section 1007 of the Oode of Oivil
Procedure, which provides, "Whenever an order for the payment of a sum of money is made by a court pursuant to the
provisions of this code, it may be enforced by execution in
the same manner as if it were a judgment."
[10] In 1951, however, section 139 was amended, and in
addition to other changes not relevant to this proceeding, a
provision was added that orders thereunder "may be enforced
by the court by execution or by such other' order or orders
as in its discretion [the trial court] may from time to time
deem necessary." Under this provision the trial court now has
discretion to determine in each case whether execution is an
appropriate remedy for enforcing its order. In the present
case the court found on sufficient evidence that to permit the
issuance and enforcement of a writ of execution would dis- !
credit defendant. professionally and impair his ability to make
the monthly payments and discharge the arrearages. Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion in conditioning the
issuance of execution on defendant's noncompliance with
its order to discharge the arrearages in installments.
To the extent that the judgment modifies the provisions
of the propert.y settlement agreement and the interlocutory
and final decree based thereon it is reversed. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its
own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, O. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
OARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion. I do not, however, agree with the reasoning.
leading thereto.
I said in my dissent in Def£ter v. Def£ter, 42 Oal.2d 36, 46
[265 P.2d 873], that this court" ••• had an opportunity
to clarify the law so that stability might be given to property
settlement agreements and agreements for support and maintenance. Not only do the majority holdings in these three
cases [Fox v. Fox, 42 Oal.2d 49 (265 P.2d 881); Def£ter v.
Dezter, 4:2 Oa1.2d 36 (265 P.2d 873); Flynn v. Plynn,42
Ca1.2d 55 (265 P.2d 865)] not settle the law, but they add
untold confusion." I said in my dissent in the Flynn case
(42 Ca1.2d 55, 62, 67) that the holding of the majority there
was an effective trap designed to catch both wary and un-

)
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wary attorneys who were honestly and conscientiously trying
to protect their clients' interests, and that it was "absolutely
impossible for attorneys to lmow whether tllis court will,
years later, determine that there was an incorporation [of
the agreement in the judgment of divorce], or order one
whether or not it was intended at the time of the interlocutory
decree. "
The main, and most vicious, error in this and in the Fox,
Dexter and Flynn cases is the holding that the agreement
of the parties may now be scrutinized to determine what the
parties intended when the agreement was executed-whether
they intended monthly payments as an integral part of a
property settlement agreement or whether they really intended such periodic payments to be alimony and therefore
subject to modification later by that court or by another
court. Even one later determination as to the intent of the
parties is not sufficient under the holdings in these casesif an appellate court so desires it may decide that the parties
intended the payments to be one or the other, and so on

ad infinitum.
In the case under consideration, we have the majority
reversing the judgment of the trial court insofar as it modified
the provisions of the "property settlement 8.,,"Teement." The
trial court had concluded that the monthly payments provided for were alimony and therefore subject to modification.
The majority here concludes that the monthly payments
were an integral part of the property settlement agreement
and therefore not subject to modification. The following
statement from the majority opinion leads the way to endless litigation between these parties and others in the same
situation: "In the absence of confl.ictin~ extrinsic evidence
as to the meaning of the agreement, the trial court's interpretation of it is not binding on this court. (Fox v. Fox,
42 Ca1.2d 49, 52 [265 P.2d 8811; Estate of Platt, 21 Ca1.2d
343, 352 [131 P.2d 825].)'~ The error in permitting this
point to be litigated and relitigated when the parties obviously intended a iinal and complete determination of their
property rights leads to this result: The trial court here
concluded that the monthly payments were alimony; the District Court of Appeal concluded that the payments were an
integrated part of a property settlement agreement and this
court is now also so holding. By its holdin/!. the case is
now set at large and there must be a retrial of the matter.
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On the new trial, other evidence may be forthcoming which
will have a bearing on what the parties intended when they
entered into the agreement. If new evidence is introduced
which shows that the parties thought they were providing
for alimony or support and maintenance payments for the·
wife, the trial court may again decide that such payments
were alimony and subject to modification; the District Court!
of Appeal might affirm the holding of the trial court, and"
it is highly probable that this court might again conclude.
that such payments were an integrated part of a property'
settlement agreement and again set the case at large for a:
new trial. This one issue has already been passed upon by:
the courts of this state four times-once when the divorce
was granted; again by the trial court when the wife applied'
for an order of execution; next by the District Court of'
Appeal, and next, but far from last, by this court. This
interminable and expensive litigation all stems from the hold- ,
ing of a majority of this court that the question of what··
the parties intended when they entered into their agreement'
is one of fact which may be relitigated at some future time. "
I have been advised by trial judges from allover the state I
that they find the rules set forth in the Fox, Dexter and '
Flynn cases extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply
in the various situations presented to them in actions for .
divorce. So long as this condition exists, this court will have
the added burden of endeavoring to correct the honest errors
made by trial courts in this type of case. This situation',
could be very easily remedied if this court would formulate'
definite understandable rules to guide lawyers and the judges
'
of the numerous superior courts of this state.
This court has not seen fit to correct its previous errors:
but, on the contrary, added to the general confusion with
its holding in the ease under consideration. It is at once
apparent from a glance at the signatures on the opinions in
all of these eases that trial judges and attorneys are not'
the only ones who are confused as to the holdings in the Fox, ~
Dexter and Flynn cases. Here, we have Mr. Justice Shenk,
who signed M.r. Justice Traynor's opinions in the Fox, Dexter <
and Flynn eases, dissenting from his opinion herein. In
passing, it should be mentioned that, in my opinion, Mr. ~
Justice Shenk in his dissent correctly applies the rules set :
forth in the Fox and Flynn cases that the trial court could "
take extrinsic evidence in aid of its interpretation of the .;
'I',
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agreement and that its conclusion based thereon was supported
by the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.·
Civil Code, sections 158, 159 and 175, all authorize contracts between husband and wife. Under the statutory law
it would be a very simple matter for this court to lay down
understandable and workable rules of law applicable to agreements for property settlement, alimony, and support and
maintenance in divorce and separate maintenance cases. Such
rules would permit lawyers properly to advise their clients,
would permit husbands and wives seeking divorce who are
honestly and intelligently endeavoring to make a division
of their property, and arrangements for support and maintenance, to do so without fear that such arrangements would
be later changed by a trial, or an appellate court. There
appears to me to be no sound reason why contracts between
such parties should not, in the absence of fraud or overreaching, be given the same stability and dignity accorded to
contracts entered into between persons not so related.
The rule of law I should like to see in effect in California
in this type of case is very simple and easy of application.
'There the parties have entered into an agreement for a
division of their property, or where one has agreed to give,
and the other to receive, periodic payments in lieu of a
division of their property, or in conjunction with a division
of their property, or for support and maintenance, or alimony,
the agreement so entered into if approved by the court as
fair, just and equitable and not the result of any fraud or
overreaching, should be the sum total of the parties' right!'
and liabilities and should not be subject to modification
unless the parties have expressly provided for a later modification, or unless a subsequent modifying agreement is executed by them.
In a divorce action, when the parties have entered into an
ngreement involving their property rights, the court should
inquire into the facts surrounding the execution thereof to
ascertain whether there has been any fraud or overreaching.
The court should also inquire into the terms and provision!'>
of the agreement to determine whether it is fair, just and
equitable. When the court approves the contract as fair, just
and equitable and determines that there has been no fraud

I
I
I
I

-In the Dexter ease it should be remembered that the majority, while
holding that the trial court could determine the character of the monthly
payments involved, affirmed the trial court's action in 8ustaining defendant's objeetion to the introduction of evidence on that issue.
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or overreaching, the matter should be forever concluded and
the parties bound by the terms of their agreement.
"
Stated simply, the foregoing proposed rules mean only'
this: That the parties have entered into an agreement which
the court has approved as fair and equitable and not the
result of fraud or overreaching; that such agreement should
be accorded the same finality and dignity as contracts entered
into between strangers.
If the above rules were in effect in California, the probe:
lem of incorporation would also be a very simple one. In
my opinion there is no incorporation of an agreement in a
divorce decree unless that agreement has been copied therein
in haectlerba, or its substance is stated therein, or unless
copy of the agreement is attached physically to the decree
of divorce and referred to as being a part thereof. When
there has been an effective incorporation of the agreement
in the judgment, the agreement is merged therein and the
effect is to make the remedy one upon the judgment rather
than by separate action on the agreement itself. Incorporation should have absolutely no effect so far as the parties'
agreement is concerned. The agreement is a contract and
its terms should govern. If the decree orders compliance
with the terms of the agreement which has been incorporated
in the judgment, the only result should be in the form of
remedy available to the party seeking to enforce the judgment. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Ca1.2d 158 [124 P.2d·
5].)
It is at once apparent that if the above rules had been
applied in the instant case, we would not have the chaos
and confusion here present. Here it is evident that the·j
parties intended a final settlement of their property rights ,
at the time the agreement was executed. The holding of the i
majority here destroys the effectiveness of the agreement :
solemnly entered into by the parties and leaves their property
and rights in a state of uncertainty and confusion.
I would therefore reverse the judgment and order.

a

SHENK, J., Dissenting.-I am unable to agree with that
portion of the opinion which holds that the alimony payments to the wife were integrated in the property settlement
agreement and were therefore not subject to modification as
provided in section 139 of the Civil Code.
A property settlement agreement should be construed as
any other agreement. Here the parties were dealing at arm'8
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length and were represented by counsel in the preparation
of the agreement. They are presumed to mean what they
said in that instrument and the words they have used are
to be taken in their ordinary and legal meaning. Here both
meanings are the same. The problem in each ease is to
ascertain the intention of the parties by the language they
have used. The parties set about to settle a "permanent
and lasting" division of their "property rights" whether
"separate or community." Permanent alimony payments do
110t fall within either category and as a general rule must
be dealt with subject to the power of the court to modify
them in accordance with the provisions of section 139 of the
Civil Code. Where in the agreement there is a clear intention to waive them or to integrate and settle them as part
and parcel of all marital and property rights, the right of
1he parties to so contract is recognized. Here, as properly
found by the court, there was no such intention. The parties
repeatedly and with obvious design used the word "alimony"
in their agreement. That word ordinarily means an allowance made to the wife by her husband for her support after
a dissolution of their marriage by divorce. It is used frequently in our statutes as incorporated in our official codes.
For example, it is specifically employed in sections 137, 140
and 142 of the Civil Code. In our decisional law it has been
used repeatedly in its ordinary sense. It must be assumed
that it was used in its ordinary sense throughout this proceeding. It was first used by the parties in their agreement,
which provides that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff
$500 per month as "alimony" for her "support and maintenance" and provides that these payments shall continue
"until the wife dies or remarries." Then in her complaint
for divoree the wife asked for an award of "alimony" in
this same sum. She prayed that the property settlement
agreement be approved and made a part of the deeree and
that the court order the defendant to pay her $500 per month
for her care, maintenance and support IC as therein agreed."
The interlocutory decree approved the property settlement
agreement and incorporated it by reference in the judgment
and ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff $500
per month for her "care, maintenanee and support • • • as
agreed in said property settlement agreement . • . until the
plaintiff dies or remarries. . . ." The word IC support" as
used in section 139 of the Civil Code of eourse means alimony.
The final deeree of divorce specifically states that "wherein
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said interlocutory decree makes any provision for aHmo'
[it] is hereby made binding on the parties affec
thereby as if herein set forth in full." Those decrees hav..
long since become final.
The use by the parties and by the court of the descriptive
and meaningful term and phrases "alimony," "care, main;
tenance and support" and "until the plaintiff dies or re~
marries" should not be disregarded and should be determina~.
tive in support of the findings and conclusions of the trial.:
.
court in the present proceeding.
But this court now says, as a matter of law, that the
parties did not mean what they said when they used the.
word "alimony" in their agreement, and that the trial court'
did not mean what it said in its divorce decrees, and that
the findings and conclusions in the present proceeding are
without support in the record. If the agreement was without
ambiguity, as both parties contend, the trial court had the
power in the first instance to declare from its language 1
alone the intention of the parties, and its determination should I
not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. A construction of
the agreement on that theory alone is reasonable. However,
each party contends that the agreement is unambiguous in
his or her favor, and this is one test of ambiguity. The fnct
that the parties themselves each ascribe different meanings
to the words used indicates the existence of an ambiguity.
(Chastain v. Belmont, 43 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [271 P.2d 498J;
California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Walters, 62 Cal.App.2d 554, e
559 [149 P.2d 17].)
.
Notwithstanding her contention that the agreement is unambiguous in her favor the plaintiff at the hearing of the
present proceeding requested the court to take extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties
as to the alimony payments. In so doing she was met by
the construction of the agreement in the prior divorce proceedings to the unmistakable effect that alimony was not
integrated in the agreement. However in compliance with
her request the trial court took extrinsic evidence. This
it had the right to do in aid of the interpretation of the
agreement when ambiguity is present or questionable. (Tuttle
v. Tuttle, 38 Ca1.2d 419, 421 [240 P.2d 587] ; Flynn v. Flynn,
42 Ca1.2d 55, 60 [265 P.2d 865] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49,
52 [265 P.2d 881].)
Having before it the terms of the agreement, the divorce
decrees and the extrinsic evidence, the trial court found and

)
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concluded that alimony as such was not intended to be integrated in the agreement and was not affected by the provision therein waiving "all right to future maintenance and
support . . . except as herein otherwise provided." The exception could have reference only to the alimony which is
"otherwise provided." In my opinion the record fully supports the findings and the conclusion of the trial court that
the alimony payments were modifiable.
I would affirm the judgment.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Husband and wife are as free
as other competent persons to contract with each other. (Civ.
Code, §§ 158, 159.) There is no reason why they cannot enter
into a property settlement agreement which includes a provision for alimony, as such, which shall be subject, within
agreed limits, to control by the court. For example,the
parties could agree to a maximum limit or to a minimum limit
or to both maximum and minimum limits, or they could include a cost-of-living sliding scale. the exact amount of contributions in each case to be fixed by the court if the parties
failed to agree. They could also provide for security to guarantee maximum payments or they could agree that the court
might order complete termination of alimony upon the showing
of the occurrence of some casualty.
A contract made by competent parties, and valid nnder
the law of contracts, dot's not for some mysterious reason become subject to alteration in or disregard of its terms merely
because the contracting parties are or were husband and wife.
But when the contract by its terms provides for the payment
of alimony the ordinary meaning of the word suggests that
the amount of alimony shall remain subject to control of
the court unless that primary meaning is expressly negated
or limited by the contract. Changing the amount of alimony
payments obviously is not an alteration of the contract where
the contract provides for "alimony" and does not prohibit
such changes.
Here, I cannot hold that as a matter of law the contract
is not subject to the interpretation given it by the trial court.
That contract was not in truth made a part of the decree of
divorce. The majority opinion states that "The decree approved and i'TIcorporated by refere'TIce the provisions of the
agreement and expressly ordered defendant to pay $500 per
month 'as agreed in said property settlement agreement.' "
(Italics added.) But, as I have heretofore pointed out
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(Flynn v. Flynn (1954),42 CaI.2d 55, 61-62 [265 P.2d 865])
the simple fact is that an agreement cannot be made a part
of a judgment unless it is in truth incorporated in the judgment so that when the judgment is copied in the judgment
book the whole of the judgment, necessarily including the
agreement which is a part of it, is set forth word for word.
" 'In no case is a judgment effectual for any purpose until
entered.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.) To enter a judgment
means to copy it in the' judgment book' so that it becomes a
permanent and public record (see Code Civ. Proc., § 668).
so that he who reads may know its content. Any portion of
a judgment not entered in the judgment book would be
ineffectual for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted
to enter any part of a judgment which had been filed, the
error of the ministerial officer could be corrected; but if he
has performed his duty and the judgment as entered is truly
the judgment as rendered, and that judgment has become
final, then neither this court nor any other court or person
has power to add words to the language of that judgment."
(Flynn v. Flynn, supra.)
Inasmuch as the agreement was not incorporated in the
decree, the trial court's determination in the light of the
entire record that the order for payment of $500 monthly
was in the nature of an award of alimony, should be upheld.
I would affirm the judgment.
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